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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROBERT E 
vs. 
TEL TECH, 
. CONGER, ) 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) 
, INC., ) 
Defendant/Respondent. ) 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Case No. 870129-CA 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In appellant's opening brief, we took the position 
that the trial court erred in ruling that Tel Tech owed no duty 
to Meadow Gold or its employees. As we noted on page 12, "Tel 
Tech unquestionably had such a duty," and the trial court 
should have ruled the duty existed as a matter of law. We 
focused the brief, however, on our contention that at minimum, 
the duty issue, according to the trial court's own analysis, 
should have been submitted to the jury, because the trial court 
based his conclusion on specific and improper factual findings 
in the face of material disputes regarding those facts. These 
erroneous findings included his conclusions that "[u]se of the 
sprayballs did not make the tanker any more or less dangerous 
than it was before," and that as long as Tel Tech's work "does 
not cause the equipment to be dangerous, [it] should not be 
held liable . . . ." (Memorandum Opinion, Addendum 1 to 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 3-4.) 
Compounding its error, the trial court also 
erroneously concluded that if an owner such as Meadow Gold 
breaches its duty to use the equipment safely, then such 
owner's negligence apparently absolves the supplier of 
responsibility as a matter of law. (Id.) 
Acknowledging (albeit disagreeing with) the view of 
the trial court that the resolution of such issues was relevant 
to whether or not a duty existed, we pointed out that at least 
a material issue of fact exists as to whether Tel Tech's 
installation of the spray balls made the tanker more dangerous 
than it was previous to Tel Tech's work. We believe the record 
is in fact undisputed that Tel Tech's work did make the tanker 
more dangerous, since it is undisputed that prior to the spray 
ball installation, there was no reason to walk on top of the 
tanker, and after said installation, Meadow Gold employees 
routinely did so to use the spray balls. The uncontradicted 
affidavit of Carl Eilers pointed out that Tel Tech's 
installation of the spray balls created a danger not previously 
existing, which danger was or should have been foreseeable to 
Tel Tech. Thus, we argued, using the trial court's own point 
of view, its ruling must be reversed and the issues of material 
fact going to the existence of Tel Tech's duty should be 
submitted to the jury. 
Nevertheless, as we argued to the trial court 
originally, we assert that Tel Tech owed a general duty of due 
to Meadow Gold by virtue of its relationship with Meadow Gold, 
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which duty extended to Meadow Gold Employees such as Conger who 
were foreseeably within the zone of risk created by Tel Tech's 
conduct. Questions addressing whether Tel Tech's specific 
conduct created or increased any risk or danger with the 
tanker, and whether Mr. Conger's or Meadow Gold's conduct was 
reasonable relative to the danger, go not to the existence of 
Tel Tech's duty, but to whether it breached its general duty of 
care given all the relevant circumstances of this case. The 
trial court confused the concepts of duty and breach of duty, 
as well as the relative roles of the court and jury respecting 
these concepts. Tel Tech, in its brief, continues and 
compounds the confusion of the trial court's ruling.1 
ARGUMENT 
I. TEL TECH OWED A DUTY TO 
MEADOW GOLD EMPLOYEES AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
This Court should rule as a matter of law that a 
general duty of care extended from Tel Tech to Meadow Gold, 
including its employees such as Mr. Conger, and should reject 
the trial court's premise that the factors discussed in its 
Memorandum Opinion are relevant to the determination of whether 
1
 For example, Tel Tech concludes that "[i]installation of 
the spray balls, even if considered a repair of the tanker, did 
not change the design of the tanker . . . " (respondent's brief 
at 28), and that "Tel-Tech installed the spray balls in 
accordance with Meadow Gold's directions" (respondent's brief 
at 35). Both conclusions are actually material issues of fact 
which, although assumed by the court to be true for purposes of 
its ruling that no duty existed, are disputed and should be 
submitted to the jury on the issue of breach of duty. 
-3-
a duty existed. The imposition of such a duty under the 
undisputed facts of this case is clearly mandated by Utah law. 
As pointed out in appellant's opening brief and again 
in detail in Tel Tech's brief at pp. 6 and 7, Tel Tech and 
Meadow Gold agreed, in other words contracted, for Tel Tech to 
provide a service to Meadow Gold, namely, the installation of 
the spray balls in the tanker. Pursuant to the contract, Tel 
Tech performed the service and received consideration therefor. 
The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized and 
approved the generally accepted tort doctrine that "contractual 
relationships for the performance of services impose on each of 
the contracting parties a general duty of due care toward the 
other, apart from the specific obligations of the contract 
itself." DCR, Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 
1983) (see also cases and authorities cited therein at p. 435, 
fn. 3, and p. 436, including fn. 8). The court in DCR 
specifically approved and cited in this regard Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, § 323 (1965): 
§ 323. Negligent Performance of Undertaking 
to Render Services 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for 
consideration, to render services to another 
which he should recognize as necessary for 
the protection of the other's person or 
things, is subject to liability to the other 
for physical harm resulting from his failure 
to exercise reasonable care to perform his 
undertaking, if 
(a) his failure to exercise such care 
increases the risk of such harm, or 
(b) the harm is suffered because of 
the other's reliance upon the undertaking. 
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The general duty between contracting parties is not 
limited only to service contracts which are ongoing until an 
injury occurs, but includes contracts such as here, where work 
is performed, the service has been completed, and the injury 
occurs some time thereafter. See, e.g., Williams v. Melby, 699 
P.2d 723, 729 (Utah 1985); Crandall v. Ed Gardner Plumbing & 
Heating, 17 Utah 2d 138, 405 P.2d 611 (1965). 
Thus, based upon the undisputed fact that Tel Tech 
contracted to perform and did perform a service for Meadow 
Gold, Tel Tech owed a general duty to exercise due care to 
Meadow Gold with respect to Tel Tech's agreement to install the 
spray balls. This duty arose by virtue of the contractual 
relationship of Tel Tech and Meadow Gold; no further inquiry or 
analysis of the facts was required or even proper. The trial 
court erred by going beyond the imposition of a general duty 
and dissecting factual issues properly within the jury issue of 
whether Tel Tech breached its duty or whether Meadow Gold or 
Conger contributed to the injury through their alleged 
negligence. 
While Tel Tech cannot avoid the legal effect under DCR 
of the contractual relationship between itself and Meadow Gold, 
it weakly attempts to claim that no duty exists because "there 
is no contractual relationship between Tel Tech and 
Mr. Conger." (Respondent's brief at 31.) Tel Tech's argument 
constitutes a distinction without difference. 
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Under DCR, Tel Tech owed a general duty of due care to 
avoid causing physical harm in connection with the performance 
of its services to Meadow Gold. The individual employees of 
Meadow Gold exposed to the risk of harm created by Tel Tech are 
obviously those persons to whom Tel Tech's duty to avoid 
causing harm runs. If Tel Tech were allowed to escape its 
general duty of due care simply on the ground that its duty 
runs to a corporation but not the corporate employee who is 
exposed to the risk, Tel Tech will have effectively insulated 
itself against its general duty of care in every case in which 
it provides services to a corporation. The concepts of tort 
duty and negligence simply do not recognize such technical 
distinctions. 
It is important to note that Tel Tech's purported 
distinction between the corporate employer and employee is 
completely ignored in cases otherwise relied upon by Tel Tech 
in its brief. For example, in both Spanqler v. Kranco, Inc., 
481 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1973), and Ayala v. V & O Press Co., 126 
A.2d 229, 512 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1987), the courts clearly assumed 
the existence of a general duty of care running from the 
defendant to the employer and employee, but simply found the 
defendant was not negligent as a matter of law, based upon the 
circumstances of those cases. 
Recognizing its obvious problem in reconciling the 
rationale for the trial court's ruling with the unambiguous 
mandate of DCR which imposes a duty herein, Tel Tech attempts 
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to distinguish DCR. Its distinctions are contrived and 
groundless. Tel Tech first claims DCR is different since the 
contract therein was between defendant and plaintiff, while 
here it is between defendant and plaintiffs employer. As 
pointed out above, this artificial distinction is meritless. 
Second, as noted above, Tel Tech's claim that the 
installation of the alarm system in DCR was defective, while 
its installation of the spray balls here was not, fails 
analysis. In both cases, the defendant installed systems which 
literally worked. But this case is even stronger than DCR, 
wherein the defendant installed a burglar alarm in DCR's store 
which was deactivated by thieves. Obviously, the installation 
by DCR of the burglar alarm did not increase the risk of 
burglaries in DCR's store. Tel Tech's installation of the 
spray balls, however, in fact created a danger which did not 
previously exist. In any event, in both cases the defendant 
had a duty to use care, and plaintiffs in both cases claim the 
harm which occurred was a risk which that particular defendant 
should have foreseen and addressed. 
Finally, Tel Tech's attempt to limit the holding of 
DCR only to cases in which the contractual relationship is for 
ongoing services and maintenance is clearly contradicted by the 
plain language of DCR and the cases and authorities which were 
cited and approved therein by the court.2 
2
 DCR, Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 433 P.2d at 436-437. 
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Tel Tech also misstates the holding of DCR in claiming 
that it simply imposed a duty to warn. In DCR, the defendant's 
duty to warn was only one theory of tort liability asserted by 
the plaintiff; it was not the scope of the defendant's duty. 
The court clearly held the scope of defendant's duty to be a 
general duty to exercise due care under the circumstances. 
DCR, Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d at 435-437. Thus, the 
court properly remanded for a determination by the trier of 
fact as to whether the defendant conformed to its general duty 
of due care in failing to properly install or maintain the 
system, or in not warning plaintiff of a potential method of 
circumventing its alarm system: 
The care to be exercised in any particular 
case depends upon the circumstances of that 
case and on the extent of foreseeable danger 
involved and must be determined as a 
question of fact. 
Id. at 435. 
A careful reading of DCR compels the rejection of Tel 
Tech's attempted distinctions as well as the faulty analysis of 
the trial court in its Memorandum Opinion, since a contractual 
relationship for the performance of services existed between 
the relevant parties in both DCR and this case. A general duty 
of due care therefore existed, and further analysis of the 
various states of knowledge, expertise, and conduct of the 
parties must be limited to the issue of breach of duty. 
Despite the trial court's stated reliance on Spangler 
v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1973), Tel Tech's brief 
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conspicuously lacks similar support, and in fact entirely 
avoids any meaningful discussion of it. Tel Tech's reluctance 
to defend and rely upon Spangler is understandable, since it is 
fundamentally inopposite in at least three ways. First, 
Spangler does not hold that the defendant owed no duty to the 
purchaser of its product or to the plaintiff. In fact, the 
opinion presumes the opposite. The trial court in Spangler 
directed a verdict for the defendant at trial at the close of 
plaintiffs evidence. The trial court obviously had concluded 
that defendant did owe a duty of care, but that the evidence at 
the conclusion of plaintiffs case at trial compelled a 
conclusion that defendant's conduct did not constitute a 
failure to conform with its duty of care. 
Second, as noted in our opening brief, Spangler's 
holding that the crane supplier was not negligent in failing to 
supply a motion warning device on a crane resulted in large 
part from the fact that the owner of the crane, for whom the 
plaintiff was working when injured, had ordered the crane 
pursuant to detailed plans and specifications, which did not 
include such a device. Meadow Gold provided no such plans and 
specifications to Tel Tech.3 
3
 Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1279 
(Utah 1982), relied on by Tel Tech, also involves this same 
obvious and material distinction. 
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Third, and likewise contrary to this case, the 
Spangler defendant did not alter, modify, or repair the crane 
in a manner which increased or created a danger not previously 
existing. Here, however, Tel Tech's installation created the 
danger: the risk of someone slipping off the tanker who 
foreseeably would thereafter walk on top to utilize the spray 
balls. Had the crane in Spangler been a nonmovable crane which 
was subsequently altered by the defendant to be mobile, the 
defendant's failure to install or recommend installation of a 
motion warning device at such time would perhaps be more 
analogous; but the facts of the Spangler case as it stands are 
easily distinguishable, and the trial court's reliance thereon 
was misplaced. 
Since the contractual nature of the relevant parties 
here was undisputed, the trial court should have simply found 
the existence of a general duty and moved on to whether summary 
judgment was possible on the ground that Tel Tech did not 
breach its duty as a matter of law. 
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT CANNOT BE GRANTED ON THE 
ISSUE OF BREACH OF DUTY. 
The issues of material fact previously discussed in 
the introduction above and in our opening brief clearly 
preclude a finding that no breach of duty occurred as a matter 
of law. As pointed out above, the trial court simply 
concluded, without basis and contrary to uncontradicted 
evidence, that Tel Tech's installation of the spray balls did 
not make the tanker more dangerous. The court's improper 
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resolution of this contested issue of fact and other material 
issues of fact obviously must be reversed. Perhaps the court 
assumed it could make such findings because it believed it was 
deciding the duty issue, a court function, as opposed to a 
breach of duty issue. In any event, however, it was wrong. 
In Williams v. Melby, 699 Po2d 723, 725 (Utah 1985), 
the Utah Supreme Court reversed a summary judgment and remanded 
for trial, where the plaintiff had presented an affidavit from 
an expert architect that raised issues of fact as to whether a 
defendant designer of an apartment building had negligently 
designed a window through which plaintiff fell. Here, 
plaintiff has likewise presented the affidavit of his expert, 
Carl Eilers, who raised similar issues of fact concerning the 
propriety of Tel Tech's actions and inactions in connection 
with its contractual services rendered to Meadow Gold. He 
noted that Tel Tech's work created a danger which did not 
previously exist on the tanker, namely, the risk of someone 
slipping off the tanker who foreseeably would walk on top to 
utilize the spray balls, which danger Tel Tech could and should 
have addressed. Likewise, the admissions of Tel Tech's 
employees and officers in their depositions concerning their 
knowledge of the very risk to which Mr. Conger was subjected, 
and Tel Tech's repeated denials of any improper or inadequate 
conduct, set up classic factual issues requiring submission to 
the jury of the question whether Tel Tech met or fell below its 
general duty of due care to Meadow Gold. 
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Tel Tech argues that, even if Tel Tech owed a duty, it 
was discharged as a matter of law by Meadow Gold's and Conger's 
knowledge of the hazard. This is wrong. Tel Tech cites cases 
involving a manufacturer's or supplier's "duty to warn," 
wherein courts have concluded that, under the facts of that 
case, no such "duty to warn" existed. Those cases were not, 
however, decided on the duty issue, but, as with Spangler v. 
Kranco, 481 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1973), on the ground that no 
breach of duty occurred under all the circumstances. The 
factual circumstances are in each case materially different 
than here. See, Raqsdale v. K~Mart Corp., 468 N.E.2d 524 (Ind. 
App. 1984), and Stodghill v. Fiat-Allis Constr. Machinery, 
Inc. , 163 Ga. App. 811, 295 S.E.2d 183 (1982), referred to at 
p. 34 of respondent's brief. 
Moreover, contrary to cases such as Ragsdale and 
Stodghill, Tel Tech's negligent conduct here arose not in the 
context of a distant manufacturer or supplier of a new product 
having no contract with the plaintiff or no opportunity to know 
of the use to which the product would be put; Tel Tech's 
negligence occurred in connection with a contract with Meadow 
Gold to modify a specific tanker to be used by Meadow Gold in a 
particular manner, which use Tel Tech clearly foresaw or should 
have foreseen. 
This case is analogous to Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 
723 (Utah 1985), discussed above and in our opening brief, 
wherein the defendant also claimed the plaintiff's knowledge of 
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the danger discharged the defendant as a matter of law. The 
court rejected the claim, noting that the plaintiff's knowledge 
of a danger is simply an issue of comparative negligence. 
"Even though plaintiff may have been negligent, summary 
judgment is an altogether inappropriate procedure for assessing 
her degree of negligence against the negligence of the 
defendant." Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d at 728 (emphasis 
added). This strong admonition to trial courts applies with 
equal force here, since the relative degree of Tel Tech's 
negligence and Conger's alleged negligence certainly cannot be 
assessed as a matter of law. 
Finally, it is wholly improper to impute any claimed 
knowledge of Meadow Gold, a non-party to this action, to 
Conger, for purposes of assessing whether Tel Tech's duty was 
discharged. The concept of comparative negligence applies only 
as between parties. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37 -38 (1953 
as amended) (repealed 1986). Thus, Tel Tech's recitation of 
what Mr. Dvorak of Meadow Gold knew or realized is irrelevant. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the 
trial court should be reversed and the case should be remanded 
for trial of the issue of Tel Tech's negligence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of September, 
1987. 
GIAUQUE, ^ JPtlfMS, WILCOX & 
BENDINJ 
By. 
Colin P. ^tlng 
Attorneys for Appell 
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